Judicial Decisions of U.S. Courts Not Involving Arbitral Proceedings by Griffin, Joseph P.
JOSEPH P. GRIFFIN*
Judicial Decisions of U.S. Courts Not
Involving Arbitral Proceedings
I. United States Supreme Court
A. ZICHERMAN V. KOREAN AIR LINES, 116 S. CT. 629 (1996)
On September 1, 1983, Korean Air Lines (KAL) Flight 007 was en route from
Anchorage, Alaska, to Seoul, South Korea, when it strayed into the Soviet Union's
air space and was shot down over the Sea of Japan.
The federal court consolidated for trial the actions arising from the KAL crash
on common issues of liability in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colum-
bia. The jury determined that the flight crew's willful misconduct was the proxi-
mate cause of the crash, thereby lifting the $75,000 cap on damages imposed
by Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention.1 The court then remanded individual
actions to the transferor courts to decide compensatory damage issues.
Petitioners subsequently won a $375,000 jury verdict in New York federal
court for loss of society, survivors' grief, loss of support and inheritance, and
decedent's pain and suffering.2 KAL appealed to the Second Circuit. It argued
that the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) governed compensatory damages
and DOHSA expressly limits recovery to pecuniary damages.3 The Second Circuit
Note: The American Bar Association grants permission to reproduce this article, or a part thereof,
in any not-for-profit publication or handout provided such material acknowledges original publication
in this issue of The International Lawyer and includes the title of the article and the name of the
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1. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air, Oct. 12, 1929, art. 25, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (hereinafter Warsaw Convention).
2. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 807 F. Supp. 1073, 1086-1088 (S.D.N.Y.
1992).
3. Death on the High Seas by Wrongful Act, 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-768 (1988) (hereinafter
DOHSA).
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held in part that federal maritime law rather than DOHSA governed, but plaintiffs
could recover loss of society damage only if they were dependents of the deceased.
The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether, under Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention, a relative may recover for loss of society. 4
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit. It
held that DOHSA, rather than federal maritime law, governed; and that, under
DOHSA, petitioners could recover only pecuniary damages. In its analysis, the
Court first determined that Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention permits recovery
for legally cognizable harm, but domestic law determines who may recover and
what compensatory damages are available to them. The court then ruled that
DOHSA applied because the decedent's death occurred within the literal terms
of 46 U.S.C. app. § 761-on the high seas more than a league beyond the U.S.
territorial boundaries. Section 762 of DOHSA provides that recovery "shall be
a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained," thereby prohibiting
recovery for nonpecuniary lossesi
II. Courts of Appeals
A. CIVIL
1. Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (l1th Cir. 1996)
Several Ethiopian victims of torture living in exile in the United States filed
suit against their torturer, Negewo, in federal district court, charging him with
responsibility for their torture and other cruel acts in violation of the Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATA).6 The lower court denied Negewo's request for appointment
of counsel and found him liable for the torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment of plaintiffs. The court awarded each plaintiff $500,000 in compensa-
tory and punitive damages.
On appeal, Negewo argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion because the ATA neither provides a private right of action nor incorporates
a right of action through reference to a treaty or federal law. He further argued
that the suit was barred because it involved a nonjusticiable political question.
The ATA provides for jurisdiction in the district courts for claims by aliens "for
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States." 7
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Negewo's
argument that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the ATA does
4. Warsaw Convention, Oct. 12, 1929, art. 17, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11.
5. 46 U.S.C. app. § 762 (1988).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994). Negewo was leading official of Addis Ababa who supervised the
torture of these victims in Ethiopia. He was subsequently seen by one of the victims in the United
States.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
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not provide a private right of action, and ruling that the statute merely requires
suit by an alien alleging that a defendant committed a tort in violation of the law
of nations. The Court of Appeals cited case law and the Torture Victim Protection
Act of 1991 (TVPA) in support of its holding that the "committed in violation"
language of the statute explicitly grants a cause of action without the need to
invoke separate enabling legislation. 8 This holding rests upon the seminal case
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, in which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that official torture was prohibited by the law of nations. 9
As for Negewo's second claim, that the political question doctrine prevents
the judicial branch from deciding issues textually committed to the legislative
or executive branch, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that not
"every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial
cognizance. 0 Without further elaboration of the province ofjudicial cognizance,
the court relied on a tort action against the Nicaraguan contra leaders that the
political question doctrine likewise did not bar. "
2. D'Almeida v. Stork Brabant B.V., 71 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 1995), petition for
cert. filed, No. 95-1443 (Mar. 8, 1996)
Gerritse Projecten (Gerritse), a Dutch manufacturer, had a contract with Stork
Brabant B.V. (Stork), an international distributor headquartered in the Nether-
lands, to supply machines. On Stork's instructions, Gerritse transported one of
the machines to a buyer in Massachusetts, and the machine turned out to be
defective. The buyer brought suit against Stork in federal court in Massachusetts.
Stork impleaded Gerritse as a third-party defendant in an action for indemnifica-
tion and contribution. The district court dismissed the action for lack of personal
jurisdiction. The issue on appeal was whether, under the Massachusetts long-arm
statute and under due process, the U.S. court could assert personal jurisdiction
over Gerritse. In a per curiam opinion, the First Circuit affirmed.
The Court of Appeals declined to determine whether Gerritse had sufficient
minimum contacts to Massachusetts.1 2 Instead, it based its holding on the fair
play and substantial justice doctrine of Asahi Metal Indus.13 Because the contract
between Stork and Gerritse designated Holland as the forum for resolving disputes
and because the compensation of a Massachusetts citizen was not at issue, the
court held that maintaining the action would violate "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice, as applied in Asahi Metal Indus. "'
8. Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1427 (C.D. Cal. 1985); Pub. L. No. 102-256,
106 Stat. 73 (1991) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (1994)).
9. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
10. Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d at 848 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)).
11. Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332, 337 (1lth Cir. 1992).
12. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
13. Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987).
14. Id.
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3. Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 1996)
Plaintiff Kaepa, Inc. (Kaepa), is an American company that manufactures
athletic shoes. Defendant Achilles Corp. (Achilles) is Kaepa's exclusive distribu-
tor in Japan. The distributorship agreement states that Texas law and the English
language govern, and that the agreement is enforceable in San Antonio, Texas.
In 1994, Kaepa filed suit against Achilles in Texas state court alleging fraud
and breach of the distributorship contract. Achilles removed the action to federal
district court and subsequently filed a mirror-image suit against Kaepa in Japan.
The district court granted Kaepa's motion for an antisuit injunction against Achil-
les, and Achilles appealed.
The Fifth Circuit rejected Achilles's argument that the district court failed to
give proper deference to principles of international comity when it granted the
antisuit injunction. The court held that a district court does not abuse its discretion
by issuing an antisuit injunction when simultaneous prosecution of the same case
in a foreign forum would result in hardship and would delay efficient resolution
of the dispute. This case involved no public international issue between the United
States and Japan, and Achilles consented in the contract to Texas jurisdiction,
Texas law, and the English language.
4. Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024 (2nd Cir. 1995)
The Second Circuit upheld a claim by Delchi Carrier, an Italian manufacturer
of portable air conditioners, under the United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) for lost profits and other expenses
based on two shipments of nonconforming compressors from Rotorex, a New
York corporation. 15 The court noted that, although the parties agreed that the
CISG governed their dispute, no case law existed to interpret the Convention.
The court therefore referred to the language of the Convention and the general
principles upon which it rested. 16 The court also noted that the Uniform Commer-
cial Code was an appropriate source of guidance, though it was not per se appli-
cable. '7
Articles 35 and 36 of the CISG state that the seller is required to deliver goods
of the quantity, quality, and description specified in the contract and that the
seller is liable for any nonconformity. Because the district court based its ruling
in part on Rotorex's own admission that its compressors did not meet the specifica-
tions for cooling power and energy consumption listed in the contract or those
of the demonstration model, the Second Circuit found no reversible error in the
lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Delchi Carrier on that
issue. "
15. United States Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, April 11, 1980,
19 I.L.M. 671, reprinted at 15 U.S.C.A. Appendix (West Supp. 1995).
16. Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d at 1028.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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Under the CISG, if the breach is fundamental, a buyer may require delivery
of substitute goods (Art. 46) or declare the contract void and seek compensatory
damages (Art. 49). Under Article 25, a breach is fundamental if its foreseeable
result substantially deprives the aggrieved party of what he is entitled to expect
from the contract. Because the cooling power and energy consumption of the
air conditioner are important to the air conditioner's value, the Second Circuit
upheld the district court's conclusion that Rotorex's failure to ship compressors
that met specifications was a fundamental breach.19
As for damages, the Second Circuit rejected Rotorex's argument that the ship-
ment caused no harm because Delchi Carrier had sufficient inventory during the
period in question to cover all sales. Certain models were not available in the
spring and early summer due to the breach.20 The Second Circuit noted that
the CISG damages for breach of contract provision was "designed to place the
aggrieved party in as good a position as if the other party had properly performed
the contract."' 
'
Moreover, the Second Circuit held that the CISG limits lost profit awards to
foreseeable losses, but that lost sales due to the supply of faulty compressors
caused a foreseeable loss. 22 Among these losses, the court included "foreseeable
and legitimate incidental or consequential damages," as defined in U. C. C. Sec-
tions 2-715(1) and (2)(a) (1991), respectively.23
In addition, the Second Circuit held that "[in the absence of a specific provision
in the CISG for calculating lost profits, the district court was correct to use the
standard formula employed by most American courts and to deduct only variable
[as opposed to fixed and variable] costs from sales revenue to arrive at a figure
for lost profits.''
24
On cross-appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the lower court by awarding
Delchi Carrier the costs associated with its attempts to remedy the defect in
Rotorex's shipments of compressors apart from lost sales revenues because the
CISG allows compensation for the full foreseeable loss due to a breach. 25 The
Second Circuit upheld the denial of costs for the modification of Delchi Carrier
units to match alternative compressors supplied by Sanyo and for 4000 additional
lost sales that the plaintiff did not sufficiently prove. Finally, the Second Circuit
remanded to the lower court the issue of whether labor costs were fixed or
variable. 6
19. Id. at 1029.
20. Id.
21. Id., citing CISG, art. 74.
22. Id., citing Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
23. Id. at 1030 (emphasis supplied).
24. Id. at 1030.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1031.
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5. Effron v. Sun Line Cruises, 67 F.3d 7 (2nd Cir. 1995)
This case concerns enforcement of a forum selection clause in a cruise ship
passenger contract that named Greece as the sole forum for adjudicating actions.
Plaintiff Nettie Effron was allegedly injured while on a Sun Line Cruise to
South America. She brought suit against Sun Line Cruises, Inc., the travel agency
that sold her the cruise, and Sun Line Greece, the Greek shipping company that
owned the cruise ship. The Passenger Ticket Contract contained a forum selection
provision, according to which the passenger agreed that all actions against the
carrier would be brought in Athens, Greece. Plaintiff argued that enforcement
of the forum selection provision would violate fundamental principles of fairness
because it would be inconvenient and expensive for her to pursue her claim in
a Greek court.
The Second Circuit reversed the decision, holding that the Passenger Ticket
Contract reasonably communicated the forum selection provision to the plaintiff.
Bold lettering on promotional materials alerted passengers to the fact that accep-
tance of the ticket constituted agreement to general terms and conditions of passage
printed on the passenger ticket, which contained the forum selection provision.
Since cruise passengers hailed from the fifty U.S. states as well as several other
countries, selection of Greece as the forum for any and all claims was also
reasonable.
6. Neely v. Club Med Management Services, 63 F.3d 166
(3d Cir. 1995) (en banc)
Plaintiff Eileen Neely, an American citizen, contracted in the United States
with Club Med Management Services, Inc., for a position as a scuba diving
instructor at Holiday Village (St. Lucia) Inc., a Club Med resort in St. Lucia.
She suffered serious injuries when the captain of a diving vessel chartered by
the resort put the vessel in reverse after she entered the water for a dive, sucking
her under the boat and into the propellers.
In her suit, plaintiff alleged that defendants caused her injuries through negli-
gence in violation of the Jones Act and through the unseaworthy condition of
the vessel in violation of general maritime law. Among their defenses, defendants
argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over both claims
pursuant to the Supreme Court's analysis developed in the Lauritzen triad."
The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, overruled an earlier panel decision in Matute
v. ProcoastNavigation, Ltd., by concluding that the multifactor Lauritzen analysis
governs choice of law in Jones Act and general maritime claims, not subject
27. The "Lauritzen triad" consists of three cases, Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953);
Romero v. International Terminal Operating, 358 U.S. 354 (1959); and Hellenic Lines Ltd. v.
Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970), which together set out the factors to be considered by courts in
determining whether a plaintiff may sue under the Jones Act.
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matter jurisdiction.28 Citing Lauritzen, the court held that determining whether
a plaintiff can assert claims under the Jones Act and general maritime law is a
question of federal law conferring jurisdiction under the federal question statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).29
Noting that the Lauritzen interest analysis was an amorphous process, the
Third Circuit interpreted it to require a two-step inquiry, triggered only when
the defendant alleges that American law is inapplicable.30 In the first step, the
plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that significant American interests
are implicated, thereby providing a basis for prescriptive jurisdiction. In the
second step, the plaintiff must present evidence showing that, given all relevant
factors, a court may reasonably apply American law. Once the plaintiff shows
that choice of American law is reasonable, the burden shifts to the defendant to
show that American law should not apply because significant foreign contacts
compel the conclusion that the application of U.S. law is unreasonable. Although
the diving vessel's registration was in St. Lucia and plaintiff's injury occurred
in St. Lucia, the court held that application of American law was reasonable
because the plaintiff was domiciled in the United States, the parties contracted
in the United States, and the majority of the resort's business originated from
the United States. Furthermore, defendants submitted no evidence to show that
St. Lucia law should apply.
7. Silvious v. Pharaon, 54 F.3d 697 (1 lth Cir. 1995) (per curium)
In 1992, plaintiff Owen Silvious brought suit against defendant Ghaith R.
Pharaon, owner and operator of the Bank of Credit & Commerce International
(BCCI), in federal court in Georgia, alleging that Pharaon defrauded him of
money deposited in BCCI. Pharaon left the United States and reportedly lived
in Saudi Arabia. After numerous attempts to serve Pharaon with process, Silvious
directed the Sheriff's Department to deliver the complaint and amended complaint
to Kethesparan Srikanthan, allegedly Pharaon's agent, at Sterling Bluff Plantation
in Georgia on January 21, 1994. Silvious filed the affidavit and certificate of
service with the district court three days later.
When Pharaon failed to answer, Silvious moved for a default judgment. The
district court dismissed the action for lack of service, holding that amended
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 4 does not permit service on an agent
when the principal is physically outside the United States. 3 Although FRCP 4(e)
provides for service on an authorized agent, the court concluded that Silvious
must serve Pharaon pursuant to revised FRCP 4(f), which provides for service
abroad, because Pharaon was not within the United States. 32 The issue on appeal
28. Matute v. Procoast Navigation, Ltd., 928 F.2d 627 (3d Cir. 1991).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
30. Neely v. Club Med Management Services, 63 F.3d 166, 182 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc).
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 4.
32. Id.
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was whether the 1993 revision of Rule 4 of the FRCP eliminated the practice
of allowing an agent in the United States to accept service of process for a foreign
defendant.33
The appellate court disagreed with the district court's interpretation of revised
FRCP 4.34 Noting that the revisions to FRCP 4 broadened the reach of service
of process instead of narrowing it, the court held that Silvious had the option of
serving Pharaon under revised FRCP 4(e), which clearly provides for substituted
service.3 5 Because FRCP 4(e) makes no reference to where the person to be
served is "found," the court interpreted the words "in any judicial district of
the United States" to describe the place where service is effected.36 Accordingly,
the court reversed the ruling and remanded to the district court to determine if
Silvious properly served Pharaon under FRCP 4(e)(2).37
8. Shell v. R.W. Sturge, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1995)
In this case, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the enforceability of a forum selection
clause in an agreement between the Society of Lloyd's (Lloyd's) and two of its
Underwriting Members (Names).
Lloyd's is an insurance marketplace in which individual Names join together
in syndicates to underwrite a particular type of business. Names are responsible
for their proportionate share of a syndicate's losses up to the limit of their net
worth. To become a Name, an individual must apply and be sponsored by an
existing member. Those accepted as Names execute a General Undertaking
Agreement with Lloyd's and enter into an Agency Agreement with a Members'
Agent who conducts insurance business on behalf of the Name. Both of the
agreements generally contain a forum selection clause that grants exclusive juris-
diction over disputes and controversies to the courts of England and a choice of
law clause that designates English law as the governing law.
Names Andrew Hauck and West Shell represented a class of Cincinnati-area
individuals who sought to rescind their contracts with Lloyd's and its agents.
They brought this diversity action in federal court in Ohio, alleging that the
defendants violated Ohio securities law by selling unregistered and nonexempt
securities in Ohio. Defendants moved to dismiss for improper venue under Rule
12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) on the ground that
English courts had exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to the forum selection clauses
in the contracts. 3S The district court granted the motion to dismiss.
In their appeal, plaintiffs argued that the forum selection and choice of law






38. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3).
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their substantive rights under Ohio securities laws. In its de novo review, the
appellate court rejected this argument. The appropriate inquiry in an international
agreement, the court said, is whether plaintiffs would be deprived of any remedy
or treated unfairly by the foreign courts. The court found no evidence that plaintiffs
would be deprived of a remedy or treated unfairly in English courts.
Plaintiffs also contended that the forum selection clause should not be enforced
because, by conflicting with Ohio's securities registration laws, the clause is
contrary to Ohio's strong public policy in favor of registration and merit review
of securities sold to its residents. The court ruled that, under The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., plaintiffs must show that Ohio's interest in protecting the
public from its own lack of knowledge outweighs the public policy interest in
maintaining the integrity of international agreements. 39 The plaintiffs did not
make this showing. The court therefore affirmed the dismissal.
9. Itoba, Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 702 (1996)
This case concerns the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws. The
Second Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's decision to dismiss
the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiff Itoba Ltd. (Itoba), a Channel Islands company, is a wholly owned
subsidiary of A.D.T. Ltd. (ADT), a transnational holding company based in
Bermuda. Lep Group PLC (Lep) is a London-based holding company with around
fifty subsidiaries operating in thirty countries. A small proportion of Lep's shares
are traded in the United States on the National Association of Securities Dealers
Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ) as American Depositary Shares
(ADSs).
In 1989, ADT considered the acquisition of one of Lep's subsidiaries, National
Guardian. Because ADT already owned shares of Lep, and Lep in turn controlled
National Guardian, ADT explored the possibility of acquiring Lep. An ADT
financial officer analyzed Lep's financial prospects, relying in part on information
Lep filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Based on
this analysis, ADT decided to acquire Lep. ADT began to make anonymous
purchases of Lep shares on the London Exchange through ADT's subsidiary,
Itoba. By November 1990, Itoba acquired around 30 percent of Lep's shares.
Before ADT could complete its acquisition of Lep, however, Lep disclosed busi-
ness reversals that resulted in a 97 percent drop in Lep's share price. The value
of Itoba's Lep holdings declined by almost $111 million.
Itoba sued Lep and its officers in federal court in Connecticut, asserting viola-
tions of sections 10(b) and 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and of
Rule lOb-5 due to lack of disclosure of material information in Lep's U.S. securi-
39. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
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ties filings.40 The court dismissed Itoba's action for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion.
To determine the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws, the Second
Circuit referred to two jurisdictional tests that emerged from previous decisions:
the "conduct test" and the "effects test." 4' Under the "conduct test," a federal
court has jurisdiction if a plaintiffs losses are directly caused by defendant's
acts or culpable failure to act within the United States, if these activities were
more than merely preparatory to the fraud. 42 The appellate court found that Lep's
allegedly misleading disclosure documents filed with the SEC and the failure to
correct or amend these disclosures constituted conduct within the United States.
Under the "effects test," a U.S. court has jurisdiction if the effects of a securities
fraud that takes place abroad are felt in the United States.43 The fact that ADT's
shares are traded on an American stock exchange and held by thousands of U.S.
investors constituted an effect in the United States, even though ADT's subsidiary,
Itoba was the purchaser of the Lep shares.
The court held in this case that the combination of U.S.-based conduct and
U.S.-based effects was sufficient to justify U.S. federal court jurisdiction.
10. Papaila v. Uniden America, 51 F.3d 54 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 187 (1995)
In Papaila, the Fifth Circuit held that the U.S. subsidiary of a Japanese corpora-
tion has standing to assert the parent corporation's rights under the U.S.-Japanese
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, which permits Japanese corpo-
rations to discriminate in favor of Japanese citizens in filling certain high-level
positions in the United States."
The plaintiff, a U.S. citizen, filed a Title VII employment discrimination action
against Uniden America Corp. (UAC), a wholly owned subsidiary of Uniden
Corp. of Japan, alleging that UAC's Japanese citizen employees received more
favorable treatment than U.S. citizen employees, including higher base salaries,
better fringe benefits, and job protection. The district court granted summary
40. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78t (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5
(1994).
41. Leasco Data Processing Equip. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1336-37 (2d Cir. 1972); Schoen-
baum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206-09 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd with respect to holding on merits,
405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
42. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1018 (1975).
43. See, generally, Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 262-63 (2d
Cir. 1989), amended on other grounds, 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. dismissed, 492 U.S. 939
(1989); In re Marc Rich & Co. A.G., 707 F.2d 663, 666-67 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S.
1215 (1983).
44. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.-Japan, art. VIII(l),
4 U.S.T. 2063, 2070 (hereinafter U.S.-Japan FCN Treaty).
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judgment to UAC on the grounds that the treaty precluded the race and national
origin discrimination claims. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the parent
corporation in Japan dictated the discriminatory conduct; and with respect to
those employment decisions, the subsidiary had standing to invoke the parent's
treaty rights.
11. Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095 (2d Cir. 1995)
In this case, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's
denial of plaintiffs' petition for discovery in aid of foreign litigation pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1782(a).
R. Esmerian, Inc. (Esmerian), a New York jewelry designer, sued French
insurance broker Euromepa S.A. and Allied Insurance and Reinsurance Com-
pany, an affiliated underwriter of commercial risk coverage (collectively MEPA)
in France for breach of duty as an insurance agent. MEPA failed to inform
Esmerian that a proposed gem courier was untrustworthy. The courier absconded
with $26 million of Esmerian's gems. The lower French court found MEPA
liable to Esmerian for $10 million. This discovery request in New York arose
in connection with MEPA's appeal to the French Court of Appeal, which permits
the hearing and consideration of new evidence not introduced at trial. MEPA
petitioned the district court to order Esmerian to produce documents and witnesses
for deposition for use in the French appeal.
The district court denied the petition on the grounds that granting MEPA's
discovery request would infringe on France's system of evidence gathering and
would not promote efficient resolution of the pending appeal in France.
The U.S. Court of Appeals held that the district court misapplied guiding
precedents and misperceived the extent to which it should consider foreign law
and procedures in its decision. The Court of Appeals ruled that the district court's
inquiry into the discoverability of requested materials in a foreign tribunal should
consider only authoritative proof that the tribunal would reject such evidence.
The court found no French judicial, executive, or legislative declarations objecting
to foreign discovery assistance in the record. The court also ruled that the district
court should have considered an appropriately crafted discovery order rather
than denying the petition, and reversed and remanded for consideration of other
options.
Circuit Judge Jacobs dissented. He argued that the majority opinion alters law
and precedent in three unwise and unnecessary ways. First, the majority opinion
greatly limits the relevance of the discoverability abroad of material sought to
be discovered; second, it withdraws deference to attitudes in the foreign forum
unless authoritative proof exists that the foreign tribunal would reject the material
discovered; and third, it effectively limits the district court's statutory discretion
to the crafting of closely tailored discovery orders rather than outright denial of
relief.
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12. In re Letter Rogatory from the First Court of First Instance in Civil
Matters, Caracas, Venezuela, 42 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1995)
The appellate court in this case affirmed the district court's holding that 28
U.S.C. § 1782, the statute governing letters rogatory, does not require a determi-
nation that the information requested in a letter rogatory comports with discovery
rules of the requesting nation when a foreign court rather than a private litigant
makes the request.
A Venezuelan court issued a letter rogatory requesting judicial assistance in
authenticating certain documents in Texas in connection with a labor dispute in
Venezuela involving the Venezuelan subsidiary of the U.S. firm Electronic Data
Systems Corporation (EDS). EDS argued that before the letter rogatory is hon-
ored, the U.S. court should determine whether the information requested is dis-
coverable under Venezuelan law. EDS maintained that the court would have
found that the letter rogatory sought information that was not discoverable under
Venezuelan law, and was therefore not enforceable.
Although the governing law, 28 U.S.C. § 1782, has no discoverability require-
ment, case law is clear that U.S. courts will routinely undertake a discoverability
determination when the request for information comes from a private litigant.
However, the Court of Appeals found no case law on point when a foreign court
requests information. Because examination for discoverability by a U.S. court
is unnecessary in such a case and would thwart efforts to foster international
cooperation, the court held that such an examination is not required when a
foreign court requests assistance.
B. CRIMINAL
1. United States v. Mueller, 74 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 1996)
Defendant Reinhard P. Mueller was majority shareholder, president, and direc-
tor of Omni Equities, Inc. When the Board of Directors liquidated the company, he
became trustee for shareholders, with authority to distribute liquidating dividends.
The Depository Trust Company, a substantial shareholder, failed to receive a
liquidating dividend. The Florida District Court convicted Mueller of bank fraud,
tax evasion, and tax perjury based on his failure to pay the liquidating dividend.
In his appeal of these convictions, he claimed that admitting into evidence the
deposition of a witness taken in England violated the Sixth Amendment confronta-
tion clause.
Although the Court of Appeals noted that depositions are generally disfavored
in criminal cases, it held in this case that the District Court properly admitted
the deposition evidence. 45 The defense counsel attended the deposition in London
and cross-examined the witness; defendant Mueller listened to the testimony on
45. United States v. Mueller, 74 F.3d 1152, 1156 (1lth Cir. 1996).
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the telephone and was able to participate through his attorney; and language was
not a barrier.
2. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), reh 'g denied, 74 F.3d
377 (2d Cir. 1996)
Plaintiffs-appellants are two groups of Croat and Muslim citizens of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, formerly a republic of Yugoslavia. Defendant-respondent Karadzic
is president of the self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb republic of Srpska. Plaintiffs
filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York under
the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATA), alleging that Bosnian-Serb military forces
violated customary international law by committing atrocities during the Bosnian
Civil War.46 Plaintiffs served Karadzic with process while he was in New York
as a United Nations invitee.
In the district court, Karadzic moved for dismissal on grounds of insufficient
service of process, lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion, and nonjusticiability of plaintiffs' claims. He submitted a memorandum of
law only on the first two issues, reserving the latter two issues for further briefing.
The district court, however, bypassed the issues of insufficient service of process
and lack of personal jurisdiction and dismissed plaintiffs' claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under the ATA. The court concluded that "acts committed by
non-state actors do not violate the law of nations. '"4 Finding that the Bosnian-Serb
military forces were not a recognized state and that Karadzic's faction was not
acting under color of any recognized state law, the court concluded that the ATA
could not provide subject matter jurisdiction for plaintiffs' claims.
The Second Circuit reversed, disagreeing with the lower court's holding that
the law of nations confines its reach to state action. The appellate court held that
"certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those
acting under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals. 4 The Second
Circuit examined the alleged offenses to determine whether they fell within the
jurisdictional grant of the ATA. The court was satisfied that alleged acts of
murder, rape, forced impregnation, torture, and arbitrary detention-to the extent
committed in pursuit of genocide and war crimes-are actionable under the ATA,
regardless of state action.
The appellate court also held that Karadzic was not immune from service of
process because he was in the United States as a United Nations invitee at the
time of service. First, plaintiff did not serve Karadzic within the limits of the
United Nations headquarters district, and thus the U.N. Headquarters Agreement
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
47. Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
48. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 74 F.3d 377 (2d Cir.
1996).
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did not apply. 49 Second, Karadzic did not benefit from section 15 of the U.N.
Headquarters Agreement because he was not a designated representative of a
United Nations member. Third, the court refused to create a federal common
law immunity for U.N. invitees in a federal judicial district, as requested by
Karadzic.
3. United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 814 (1996)
The issue in this case is whether the Fourth Amendment protects against extra-
territorial searches by foreign officials with the participation of United States
Government agents. Appellants are six individuals indicted and convicted of
drug-related crimes. Danish authorities wiretapped telephones in their hotel rooms
in Denmark at the request and with the assistance of United States Government
agents. The United States introduced tapes of the wiretaps as evidence in federal
district court, and this evidence led to the conviction. Appellants argued in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth District that (1) Danish authorities engaged
in a joint venture with U.S. officials; (2) the search was unreasonable; and
(3) the United States did not rely in good faith upon representations by the foreign
authorities that the wiretaps complied with their law.
The Ninth Circuit started with the proposition that neither the Fourth Amendment
nor the exclusionary rule applies to acts of foreign officials. An exception to this
proposition applies when U.S. agents participate in the investigation to the extent
that the action becomes ajoint venture between the United States and foreign officials.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that, in this case, U.S.
and Danish officials engaged in a joint venture in conducting the wiretaps.
The next inquiry was whether the search was reasonable. Because the district
court determined that the wiretap complied with Danish law, the appeals court
held that it was reasonable. The court did not reach the question whether the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied because of its holding that
the search was reasonable.
4. United States v. Gecas, 50 F.3d 1549 (11 th Cir. 1995)
In this case, the Eleventh Circuit considered for the first time whether a witness
may invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination for fear of
foreign prosecution if (1) the testimony would tend to incriminate him under
foreign law and (2) he has a real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution.
Contrary to holdings in the Fourth and Tenth Circuits, which denied extension
of Fifth Amendment protection to witnesses who fear only foreign prosecution,
the Eleventh Circuit held that the Fifth Amendment privilege may be invoked
when the witness has a real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution.
49. Agreement Between the United Nations and the United States Regarding the Headquarters
of the United Nations, 22 U.S.C. § 287 note (1994) (hereinafter U.N. Headquarters Agreement).
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In 1991, the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) subpoenaed Vytautas Gecas,
a resident alien of Lithuanian birth, to testify and produce documents relating
to his immigration to the United States in 1962 and his activities in Europe during
the Second World War. OSI is an arm of the Criminal Division of the Department
of Justice charged with gathering evidence of alleged Nazi collaborators residing
illegally in the United States and using that information to deport them. Gecas
appeared but refused to answer any questions, asserting his Fifth Amendment
privilege on the ground that the testimony would tend to incriminate him under
the laws of Israel, Lithuania, and Germany.
The district court ordered Gecas to testify, holding that the Fifth Amendment
privilege was not a personal right and could therefore be asserted only in the
limited context of a criminal prosecution by U.S. federal or state governments,
and only to prevent overreaching in the enforcement of U.S. domestic criminal
law. Addressing the issue for the first time, the Eleventh Circuit rejected this
contention. The Eleventh Circuit found that the Fifth Amendment privilege is a
personal right that permits an individual to remain silent when his testimony may
be adverse to his penal interests, even if his fear is of prosecution from a foreign
government.
The court held, however, that the witness must demonstrate that his testimony
would tend to incriminate him under foreign law and that he has a real and
substantial fear of foreign prosecution. In Gecas, the appellate court determined
that the laws of Israel and Lithuania punish Nazi war collaborators, and the
testimony sought by OSI could establish that Gecas was a collaborator. The
district court determined that Gecas had a real and substantial fear of foreign
prosecution based on OSI's purpose and operation and based on the fact that he
would be deported to one of the countries that could prosecute him if OSI obtained
the information it sought.
5. Reinhold Marsoner v. United States, 40 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 1994)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2558 (1995)
Reinhold Marsoner, an Austrian national residing in the United States, is the
target of a federal grand jury investigation into possible violations of U.S. tax
laws. The grand jury ordered him to sign a disclosure directive to all banks,
including Austrian banks, authorizing disclosure of bank information or docu-
ments. He refused to sign the directive, arguing that it violated his rights under
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution and under
Austrian law.
The appellate court rejected Marsoner's arguments and affirmed the district
court's contempt order. With respect to the claimed violation of Austrian law,
the court held that principles of international comity did not preclude enforcement
of the district court's order to compel Marsoner to sign the directive. In reaching
this determination, the court referred to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rela-
tions Law § 403, which states that "reasonableness" is the essential element in
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jurisdiction to prescribe.5 0 The court then balanced the interests of the United
States in investigating potential tax fraud against the interests of Austria to the
extent they are affected by the court order to determine whether application of
U.S. law was reasonable. The court found that, on balance, the U.S. interest
outweighed Austria's interest in this case.
C. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
1. Brown v. Valmet-Appleton, 77 F.3d 860 (1996)
Kenneth Brown suffered serious injury when a paper winder crushed his right
hand and arm as he operated the machinery at a Mississippi paper mill. He filed
a product liability suit against, inter alia, the supplier of the machine, Valmet
Paper Machinery, Inc. (Valmet). Valmet, a Finnish corporation, is 70 percent
owned by the Finnish Government. Valmet moved to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).5 1
The district court denied the motion because it found that the commercial activity
exception to immunity applied.52
Valmet contended in this interlocutory appeal that plaintiffs did not allege with
sufficient particularity the jurisdictional facts required to overcome the FSIA's
presumption of immunity. The court affirmed the decision below. It found that
information from interrogatories and other discovery documents supported plain-
tiff's allegations that Valmet was involved in production, distribution, and/or
installation of the paper winder that caused Brown's injuries.
2. EI-Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
Hassan El-Fadl, a Jordan-based former regional manager of Petra Bank's Dis-
trict of Columbia subsidiary, Petra International Banking Corporation (PIBC),
brought suit against PIBC, the Central Bank of Jordan (Central Bank), its Gover-
nor and Deputy Governor, and Petra Bank (together, the Jordanian defendants),
alleging wrongful termination, malicious prosecution, and false arrest. Mr. El-
Fadl was a senior manager responsible for currency and precious metals trading
in Jordan for PIBC. PIBC and El-Fadl signed a contract under which El-Fadl
would be "permanently employed for life [with PIBC]." 53 Petra Bank, a privately
owned bank in Jordan, owned 70 percent of PIBC.
In August 1989, the Central Bank placed Petra Bank in receivership, claim-
ing widespread financial improprieties. The Deputy Governor of the Central
Bank, Michael Marto, came to the District of Columbia to administer the
liquidation of PIBC. In September, Marto sent El-Fadl a termination letter
50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (1986).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1602-1611 (1994).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994)
53. EI-Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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and on October 29, 1989, authorities arrested El-Fadl as part of the Central
Bank's investigation. The State Security Court declared Mr. El-Fadl innocent
on April 9, 1992. 54 Mr. El-Fadl maintains that the military police falsely
arrested and tortured him for five days and detained him in Jordan during the
pendency of his charges.
The district court dismissed the claims against the Central Bank, Governor
Nabulsi, and Deputy Governor Marto under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA).55 The court found that the Central Bank was a foreign state under
the FSIA, and that it did not waive its sovereign immunity.56 The court ruled
that Nabulsi and Marto were also immune because El-Fadl sued them in their
official capacities as agents of the Central Bank. The court rejected El-Fadl's
arguments that his claims fell under the noncommercial tort exception or the
commercial activity exception to the FSIA.57
On appeal, El-Fadl abandoned his claims against the Central Bank and Nabulsi
but maintained his claims against Marto on the ground that Marto acted in an
individual capacity as Chairman and General Manager of PIBC while he adminis-
tered its liquidation. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision to
dismiss the claims against Marto because the only evidence on the record indicated
that his "activities in managing PIBC were neither personal nor private, but were
undertaken only on behalf of the Central Bank.- 58 Accordingly, the court denied
El-Fadl permission to pursue discovery against Marto as that discovery would
"frustrate the significance and benefit of entitlement to immunity from suit." 59
The next issue was whether the district court could assert personal jurisdiction
over Petra Bank in the District of Columbia for transacting business pursuant to
the District's long-arm statute or for doing business in the District for the purposes
of general jurisdiction. 60 El-Fadl alleged that because he was a PIBC employee
and PIBC was located in the District, Petra Bank employed him in the District
when Petra Bank allegedly tortiously interfered with his employment contract
and defamed him. He further alleged that, by entering into collateral loan
agreements in the District, Petra Bank was "contracting to supply services in
the District of Columbia.-
61
The D.C. Circuit held, however, that because El-Fadl failed to demonstrate
any connection between Petra Bank's alleged jurisdictional acts and the District,
the acts described could not confer specific jurisdiction under the long-arm stat-
ute. 62 The Circuit affirmed on two additional grounds: (1) that El-Fadl made no
54. Id.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1994).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1994).
57. EI-Fadl, 75 F.3d at 671, citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605(a)(2), (5) (1995).
58. 75 F.3d at 671.
59. Id. (citations omitted).
60. D.C. Code Ann. §§ 13-423(a), 13-672 (1995).
61. Id., citing D.C. Code Ann. § 13-423(a)(2) (1995).
62. Id., citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984).
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showing that Petra Bank purposefully directed the alleged tortious conduct at the
District of Columbia, and (2) that the court lacked jurisdiction under Section
13-422 of the District's long-arm statute because the evidence showed that Petra
Bank formed under the laws of Jordan and maintained its principal place of
business there.63
Finally, the D.C. Circuit reversed the lower court's dismissal of Petra Bank
and PIBC on grounds of forum non conveniens because of gaps in PIBC's expert
testimony on Jordanian law and the underdeveloped record. Neither PIBC nor
Petra Bank met their burden to show that Jordan was an adequate alternative
forum. Special Jordanian laws and decrees appeared to bar El-Fadl from bringing
his causes of action there. 64 The D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded the dismissal
of the claims against Petra Bank for lack of personal jurisdiction and reversed
and remanded the dismissal of the claims against Petra Bank and PIBC on grounds
of forum non conveniens
3. Aldy v. Valmet Paper Mach., 74 F.3d 72 (5th Cir. 1996)
A paper machine crushed to death Charles Aldy and Charley Malone at the
Stone Container Corporation's paper mill in Hodge, Louisiana. Valmet Paper
Machinery (Valmet), a company controlled by the Finnish Government, manufac-
tured the paper machine that caused their deaths. Decedents' legal representatives
brought suits under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), alleging
wrongful death, faulty design and construction, and failure to warn.
66
The Magistrate denied Valmet's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction based on the commercial activities exception to the FSIA, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(2). The third clause of that section provides that a foreign sovereign
is not immune from suit in any case in which the action is based "upon an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity
of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United
States." 67 The Magistrate found that Valmet made the paper-making machines
outside the United States in Finland, and the alleged defects and negligence caused
the direct effect of death of the decedents.68
The Magistrate further held that the plaintiffs need not allege specific defects
in order to establish subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. Rather, the lack
of specifics would result in dismissal in a summary judgment motion on the
merits at a later stage in the proceedings.69
The Fifth Circuit considered whether Valmet lost its immunity under the com-
63. Id., citing Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985).
64. Id. at 678.
65. Id. at 678-9.
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1602, 1605(a)(2) (1994).
67. Aldy v. Valmet Paper Mach., 74 F.3d at 74, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994).
68. Id. at 74.
69. Id.
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mercial activities exception. Valmet did not dispute that it designed and manufac-
tured paper machines in Finland, or that it designed and manufactured the machine
that killed the decedents. Thus, the Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiffs estab-
lished the necessary connection between the plaintiffs' cause of action and the
commercial acts of the foreign sovereign.70 Moreover, the court found that the
suits appeared to be "classic design and manufacturing defect suits, which the
third clause of the commercial activities exception is broad enough to cover." 7
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's finding that plaintiffs'
allegation that the design or manufacturing defect of the paper machine was the
immediate cause of decedents' deaths constituted a sufficiently direct effect to
establish subject matter jurisdiction.7
Finally, the Fifth Circuit rejected Valmet's contention that the commercial
activities exception does not encompass failure-to-warn claims. Valmet argued
that the failure to act was not an act sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction
under the FSIA. To the contrary, the Fifth Circuit held that an omission is an
act; and since that act occurred outside the United States and caused a direct
effect in the United States, the court had jurisdiction.
4. Antoine v. Atlas Turner, Inc., 66 F.3d 105 (6th Cir. 1995)
Defendant Atlas Turner, Inc. (Atlas), is a subsidiary of Societe National de
L'Amiante, a Crown Corporation of Canada. Atlas is therefore an instrumentality
of a foreign state under the FSIA.74 Plaintiffs obtained default judgments against
Atlas in four asbestos personal injury cases and sought to enforce the judgments
in federal district court in Ohio. The district court denied Atlas's motion for
relief from the judgments and Atlas appealed.
In its appeal, Atlas argued, inter alia, that it did not receive proper service of
the default judgments under § 1608(e) of the FSIA. 5 This section requires that
any judgment against agencies or instrumentalities of a foreign state be sent to
the foreign state. The court held that if copies of the default judgment are not
served in accordance with § 1608(e), the judgment is voidable, not void.
The plaintiffs did not serve the judgments according to § 1608(e) of the FSIA.
Plaintiffs served the judgments on Atlas's attorney of record during the asbestos
litigation, but he was no longer Atlas's attorney when plaintiff served the default
judgments. He previously filed a Notice of Withdrawal and notified all counsel
of record. Whether the default judgments were voidable depended on whether
70. Aldy v. Valmet Paper Mach., 74 F.3d at 75.
71. Id., citing Ohntrup v. Firearms Ctr., 516 F. Supp. 1281, 1286-87 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd,
760 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1985).
72. Id., citing Ohntrup v. Firearms Ctr., 516 F. Supp. at 1287.
73. Id.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1994).
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1994).
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Atlas had actual notice of the judgments. The court remanded for further findings
on this issue.
5. Export Group v. Reef Indus., 54 F.3d 1466 (9th Cir. 1995)
This case interprets 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(B), the noncommercial tort excep-
tion to the FSIA. This exception grants subject matter jurisdiction over foreign
states and their instrumentalities for claims involving tortious acts or omissions,
but is limited by § 1605(a)(5)(B), which excepts certain noncommercial torts-
including interference with contract rights-from the grant of jurisdiction.76 The
Ninth Circuit held that § 1605(a)(5)(B) does not curtail the FSIA's grant of subject
matter jurisdiction over claims relating to a foreign state's commercial activities.77
The Export Group, a U.S. general partnership that specializes in representing
North American companies that sell to Mexican Government agencies, reached
an exclusive agreement with Reef Industries to act as Reef's agent in bidding
on a contract with a Mexican Government agency. When an employee of the
Mexican Government agency allegedly divulged the details of the Export Group's
bid to the director of the Mexican Coffee Institute (INMECAFE), resulting in
the Export Group's loss of the contract and approximately $2 million, the Export
Group brought suit against INMECAFE and others, alleging various business
torts, including interference with business and contractual relations.
The district court entered a default judgment against INMECAFE when it
failed to appear. INMECAFE then moved to set aside the default judgment on
the ground that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the
FSIA. The district court granted the motion, ruling that the exceptions in 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(B) to subject matter jurisdiction over instrumentalities of
sovereign foreign governments, which include interference with contract rights,
are not limited to noncommercial torts.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. Citing Joseph v. Office of Consulate
Gen. of Nigeria, the court stated, "[tihe clear statutory language of section
1605(a)(5) indicates that both this exception and the restrictions upon this excep-
tion are intended to apply only to torts 'not otherwise encompassed in [section
1605(a)(2)].' ,,7 The court also noted that other courts have addressed claims
based on the torts listed in 1605(a)(5)(B), using the commercial activity exception.
6. Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 187 (1995)
Appellants in this case were Alberta Pork Producers Development Corporation
(Alberta Pork), a marketing board established by Canadian hog producers pursu-
ant to the Alberta Marketing of Agricultural Products Act, and Fletcher's Fine
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1994).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994).
78. Joseph v. Office of Consulate Gen. of Nigeria, 830 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1987).
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Foods (FFF), a pork processing plant headquartered in British Columbia and
owned by Alberta Pork.
FFF owned, through subsidiaries, Golden Gate Fresh Foods (GGFF), a Califor-
nia pork processing plant, which operated under the trade name Victor Fine
Foods. During the time FFF owned GGFF, GGFF had financial difficulties. In
1991, when FFF discontinued financial support to GGFF, GGFF terminated its
health benefit plan for employees and, within a month, closed the plant and
terminated all employees. The former employees brought a class action suit
against Alberta Pork, FFF, and GGFF for claims arising out of GGFF's termina-
tion of their health care coverage and employment.
Alberta Pork and FFF moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, citing the FSIA.7 9 The district court assumed that the FSIA protected
both entities, but that neither entity was immune to the court's jurisdiction because
the FSIA's commercial activity exception applied.80
The appeals court dealt with three issues. First, it determined that Alberta
Pork was an agent or instrumentality of a foreign government within the meaning
of the FSIA because the Alberta Products Marketing Council, a governmental
body, approved its establishment and controlled its activities." The court reached
the opposite conclusion with respect to FFF, because FFF was neither an organ
of a foreign state nor did a foreign state own the majority of FFF's shares. Thus
the court affirmed the ruling below that FFF was subject to the court's jurisdiction.
Second, the court held that the FSIA's commercial activities exception did not
apply to Alberta Pork.82 For this exception to apply, the statutory language re-
quires not only that a defendant engage in a commercial activity, but also that
the plaintiffs cause of action be based upon the commercial activity in question.83
The court held that although Alberta Pork did engage in commercial activities
by selling hogs to pork processors in the United States and by owning subsidiaries
through intermediaries, the employees did not base their claims, which arose
from GGFF's termination of employment and health care coverage, on either
activity. The court found no evidence that Alberta Pork participated in any deci-
sions concerning GGFF's operations, including the decisions to terminate the
health plan and close the plant.
Third, the court held that Alberta Pork did not waive its immunity under the
FSIA for purposes of the present case even though it might have submitted to
U.S. jurisdiction in connection with an unrelated loan collection action by a
Washington bank 84
79. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994) (hereinafter FSIA).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994).
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1994).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994).
83. Id.
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(1) (1994).
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7. McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 52 F.3d 346
(D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 704 (1996)
This case concerns the commercial exception to the FSIA. Following remand
after an interlocutory appeal, the U.S. District Court denied Iran's motion to
dismiss, holding that the complaint alleged sufficient facts to show a direct effect
in the United States as required to obtain subject matter jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
In 1959, McKesson Corporation helped Iranian citizens establish a dairy in
Iran. McKesson provided top management for the dairy, controlled the board
of directors, and held 31 percent of the equity interest in the dairy in 1979, when
the Iranian revolution began. This lawsuit is one of a series filed by plaintiffs
to obtain compensation from Iran for losses from claimed expropriation by Iran
and several agencies and instrumentalities.
In 1988, plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment against Iran
on the issue of liability. Iran moved to dismiss the underlying complaint for lack
of jurisdiction under the FSIA. The district court denied the motion and Iran
filed an interlocutory appeal. The appellate court affirmed the district court's
judgment that the facts alleged by McKesson were sufficient to confer subject
matter jurisdiction under the FSIA's commercial exception and remanded to the
district court for further proceedings.85 After the remand, the Supreme Court
issued its decision in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. 86 Claiming that
Weltover reversed the appellate court's ruling, Iran moved again to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction under the FSIA. The district court held that the evidence was
sufficient to support a finding that Iran's alleged actions had a direct effect in
the United States, despite the decision in Weltover. The appellate court affirmed.
The court agreed with Iran that Weltover changed the law, but disagreed that
the change was material to the outcome of its previous ruling in this case. For
the commercial exception to sovereign immunity to confer jurisdiction, alleged
actions by a sovereign or its instrumentalities must cause direct effects in the
United States.87 Before Weltover, some courts, including the D.C. Circuit, re-
quired that the direct effects also be substantial and foreseeable.88 The Supreme
Court in Weltover rejected these additional requirements." Weltover did not
change the earlier ruling in McKesson, according to the appeals court, because
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994); McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438
(D.C. Cir. 1990), on remand, 759 F. Supp. 855 (D.D.C. 1991), aff'd, appeal dismissed, 52 F.3d
346 (D.C. Cir. 1995), and cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 704 (1996).
86. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994).
88. McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 52 F.3d 346, 350 (D.C.Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S.Ct. 704 (1996).
89. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618.
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that decision held that the effects of Iran's alleged actions were foreseeable,
substantial, and direct. 90
D. IMMIGRATION
1. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045
(9th Cir. 1995)
The INS arrested eight Palestinian aliens in January 1987 after initiating depor-
tation proceedings based on the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952.9' One of the
charges under the 1952 Act was membership in the Popular Front for the Libera-
tion of Palestine, an organization that allegedly advocates doctrines of world
communism. Assisted by several organizations, the eight challenged the constitu-
tionality of the 1952 Act. Shortly before the district court hearing, the INS dropped
the ideological charges; and the court held that it lacked jurisdiction on ripeness
grounds.
Congress repealed the 1952 Act in 1991. The INS subsequently instituted new
deportation proceedings against two of the eight Palestinians under the terrorist
activity provision of the Immigration Act of 1990, which permits the exclusion
of aliens who belong to an organization that "affords material support to any
individual, organization, or government in conducting a terrorist activity at any
time. ' ' 92 All eight aliens then filed suit in federal court alleging that the INS
singled them out for selective enforcement of immigration laws for an impermissi-
ble motive, retaliation against constitutionally protected associational activity.
On January 7, 1994, the district court granted a preliminary injunction against
deportation for six of the plaintiffs, but held that it lacked jurisdiction over the
selective enforcement claim of the other two plaintiffs. The INS appealed the
grant of preliminary injunction and the two plaintiffs appealed the court's determi-
nation that it lacked jurisdiction. The court consolidated the appeals.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction against deportation for
the six Palestinians. Rejecting the government's contention that aliens in deporta-
tion hearings have less than full First Amendment protections, the court held
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary
injunction since the evidence indicated a strong likelihood of success on the
Palestinians' claim of selective enforcement.
The appellate court also vacated the district court's decision that it lacked
jurisdiction over the selective enforcement claims of the other two Palestinians
on ripeness grounds. The court rejected the government's argument that the legal
issues in the deportation hearing and the selective enforcement claim were the
90. McKesson, 905 F.2d at 451.
91. McCarran-Walter Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988) (hereinafter the 1952 Act).
92. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(B) (1994)); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (1994).
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same. The appellate court found, on the contrary, that the selective enforcement
claim would require the court to consider patterns of INS prosecutions rather
than application of a statute; and thus the appellate court remanded to the district
court for further proceedings.
2. Kofa v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 60 F.3d 1084
(4th Cir. 1995)
This case involves construction of 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B), the statute that
governs eligibility for withholding of deportation for aliens whose life or freedom
would be threatened in the country of deportation. In Kofa, the Fourth Circuit
joined the First, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of
Appeals in construing 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B) to mean that, once an alien is
convicted of an aggravated felony, he is per se a danger to the community and
is thus ineligible for withholding of deportation. A separate determination of
dangerousness by the Attorney General is not required.
The court consolidated two cases for this appeal. Kofa, a citizen of Liberia,
faced deportation to Liberia because the State of Maryland convicted him of two
aggravated felonies involving possession and distribution of cocaine. Moreno-
Duran, a native of El Salvador and a citizen of Panama, faced deportation to
Costa Rica because the State of Virginia convicted him of possession of cocaine
with intent to distribute, an aggravated felony. In both cases, an immigration
judge found the appellant ineligible for withholding of deportation because of
the aggravated felony conviction. Each argued on appeal that, under the statute,
an alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony is entitled to a separate determi-
nation of whether he is a danger to the community.
The court agreed with the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS)
view that the statute is unambiguous and clearly states that, once an alien is
convicted of a particularly serious crime, he is therefore a danger to the community
and is ineligible for withholding under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B).
3. United States v. Smyth, 61 F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g en banc
denied, 72 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1996)
This case involves construction of the unique defense to extradition contained
in Article 3(a) of the 1986 Supplementary Extradition Treaty between the United
States and the United Kingdom.93 The United States and the United Kingdom
negotiated the Supplementary Extradition Treaty to curtail judicial application
of the political offense exception in the 1972 U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, which
denied extradition of Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) members to the
93. Supplementary Treaty to the Extradition Treaty of June 8, 1972, June 25, 1985, U.S.-U.K.,
S. Exec. Rep. No. 17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-17 (1986) (hereinafter Supplementary Extradition
Treaty).
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United Kingdom. 94 Although the Supplementary Extradition Treaty greatly limits
the political offense exception to extradition, Article 3(a), which the Senate added,
creates a defense to extradition if the fugitive establishes by a preponderance of
the evidence that the extradition would lead to detention and punishment on
account of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions.
Northern Ireland convicted James J. Smyth, an IRA member, of attempted
murder of a prison officer in Northern Ireland in 1978 and sentenced him to
twenty years in prison. In 1983, he escaped from a Northern Ireland maximum
security prison to San Francisco, where he lived and worked until U.S. authorities
arrested him in 1992. The United Kingdom requested his extradition pursuant
to the Extradition Treaty and the Supplementary Extradition Treaty to serve out
his remaining sentence for the 1978 conviction.
The district court denied certification of extradition on three grounds: (1) the
United Kingdom did not rebut the presumption that Smyth would face retaliatory
punishment and harm upon his return to Northern Ireland (because the United King-
dom refused to produce documents as ordered, claiming various privileges based
on national security, the court gave Smyth the benefit of evidentiary presumptions);
(2) even without the benefit of the evidentiary presumption, Smyth established that
he would be punished if he was returned to prison in Northern Ireland; and
(3) Smyth established that he would be punished, detained, and his personal liberty
restricted at the conclusion of his prison term in Northern Ireland. 95
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for an order for Smyth's extradition.
The appellate court found, contrary to the district court's findings, that Smyth
did not meet his burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence
that he personally would be a target of harassment and retaliation within Northern
Ireland's justice system for his race, religion, or political beliefs. The court held
that Article 3(a) of the Supplementary Extradition Treaty requires an individual-
ized inquiry into the treatment that likely will be accorded an extraditee upon
extradition, but does not permit denial of extradition on the basis of an inquiry
into the general political conditions extant in Northern Ireland.
III. United States District Courts
A. CIVIL
1. In re Application of Sarrio S.A., No. M 9-372, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14822 (S.D.N.Y. October 11, 1995)
Sarrio S.A. (Sarrio) brought a breach of contract action against three Spanish
corporations and the Kuwait Investment Authority (collectively the Movants) in
Spain in 1993. In May 1995, in connection with the Spanish litigation, Sarrio
94. Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., 28 U.S.T. 227 (hereinafter Extradition Treaty).
95. In re Extradition of Smyth, 826 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
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served Chase Manhattan Corporation and Chase Bank N.A. (Chase) with subpoe-
nas for documents "located within the United States at any time on or after
May 1, 1995."96 European branches sent the only documents responsive to the
subpoenas to Chase's New York office in 1994 to determine whether they re-
sponded to an earlier proposed subpoena. The Movants brought a motion seeking
a protective order to limit discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to production of
evidence located within the borders of the United States or, alternatively, to
quash the subpoenas. The court ruled that documents originally located outside
the United States need not be produced pursuant to the subpoena.
The court concluded that the legislature only enacted the relevant statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1782, to facilitate access to discovery evidence located within the United
States. Although the language of the statute does not limit discovery of documents
to those located within the United States, the court determined from the legislative
history that Congress, when it amended § 1782 in 1964, intended the statute to
assist "foreign and international tribunals and litigants in obtaining oral and
documentary evidence in the United States." 97 Moreover, Professor Hans Smit,
who prepared the final version of § 1782, stated in his affidavit that the purpose
of the statute was to provide evidence from witnesses and documents located in
the United States only. He noted the policy grounds for such a limitation. If
litigants in foreign courts could use § 1782 to obtain discovery evidence located
outside the United States, the statute would interfere in court procedures abroad
and cause an influx of discovery applications in the United States.
2. Leslie v. Lloyd's of London, No. H-90-1907, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15380 (S.D. Tex. August 25, 1995)
Plaintiff Charles Leslie is an individual American retrocessional underwriter,
or "Name," who has been a member of Lloyd's since 1977. Leslie filed suit
against defendant Lloyd's alleging breach of fiduciary duties, deceptive acts or
practices in violation of Texas law, and violation of federal securities laws. Leslie
maintained that Lloyd's "insiders" -Names located inside the United Kingdom-
concentrated long-tail asbestos and pollution risks in syndicates underwritten
primarily by recently recruited "outside" Names while they kept the more lucra-
tive and less risky lines of insurance for themselves.
Leslie contends that in 1986, Lloyd's induced him to sign a new General
Undertaking that contained forum selection and choice of law clauses. These
clauses, if enforced, required Leslie to bring all claims arising out of his member-
ship in Lloyd's in England for resolution according to English law. According
to Leslie, Lloyd's and its agents never explained the effect these clauses would
96. In re Sarrio S.A., No. M 9-372, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14822 at 3 (S.D.N.Y. October
11, 1995).
97. Id., quoting S. Rep. No. 1580, 88th Congress, 2nd Sess. (1964).
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have on lawsuits that Lloyd's anticipated would soon be filed by its American
Names.
When Leslie filed suit against Lloyd's in U.S. District Court in Texas, Lloyd's
moved to dismiss on several grounds, including improper venue based on the
forum selection clause in the contract. The court applied federal admiralty law
to determine whether to enforce the forum selection clause. United States admi-
ralty law considers forum selection clauses presumptively valid and enforceable
unless enforcement is unreasonable. Because Lloyd's mandated the revised Gen-
eral Undertaking only in 1986, when reports surfaced that American Names
planned to sue Lloyd's and because Lloyd's did not make full disclosure of the
effect these clauses would have on Leslie's legal rights, the court concluded that
Lloyd's and its agents induced Leslie to accede to the forum selection clause
by fraud and overreaching, thus making enforcement unreasonable. The court.
therefore denied Lloyd's motion to enforce the forum selection clause. The court
also denied Lloyd's motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens,
concluding that an English court would have more difficulty adjudicating the
legal rights of a U.S. citizen under complex U.S. securities and consumer protec-
tion statutes than a U.S. court would have applying English common law. Finally,
the court granted Lloyd's motion for interlocutory appeal.
3. Firma Melodiya v. ZYX Music GmbH, 882 F. Supp. 1306
(S.D.N.Y. 1995)
Plaintiffs are Firma Melodiya (Melodiya), a Russian state enterprise that re-
cords, manufactures, and distributes phonorecords, and BMG, a New York part-
nership licensed to distribute Melodiya's recordings in the United States. Defen-
dants are ZYX Music GmbH (ZYX), a German manufacturer and distributor
of phonorecords; HDA Entertainment Group Pty. Ltd. (HDA), an Australian
manufacturer and distributor of phonorecords; and Philip Allwood, the Australian
citizen director of HDA.
In June 1994, ZYX shipped compact discs containing Melodiya recordings
and trademarks into New York. On September 19, 1994, plaintiffs filed suit
against defendants in New York federal court for alleged violations of federal
and state laws on copyright and trademark infringement, unfair competition,
trademark dilution, false advertising, and deceptive acts and practices. Plaintiffs
then moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent defendants from continuing
sales of the Melodiya recordings. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint
based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The district court denied defen-
dants' motion and granted the preliminary injunction.
The court based its decision not to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens
on two factors. First, defendants failed to show that an adequate alternative forum
existed. Although HDA and Allwood were Australian citizens and therefore
subject to jurisdiction of Australian courts, ZYX suggested only that it may be
subject to suit in Australia. Second, the court found that the balance of public
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and private interests weighed in favor of plaintiffs' choice of forum. Because
the central issues in the case concerned violations of U.S. trademark and copyright
laws, analysis of foreign law would be a minor part of the case. Since defendants
sold the disputed compact discs in New York and ZYX's distribution arm is a
New York corporation, many of the witnesses were in New York. Finally, the
witnesses' willingness to come to New York at plaintiffs' expense to testify at
the preliminary injunction hearing obviated concerns about lack of compulsory
process over nonparty foreign witnesses.
4. Eskofot A/S v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours, 872 F. Supp. 81
(S.D.N.Y. 1995)
Plaintiff Eskofot A/S (Eskofot) is a Danish company that produces graphic
arts and printing equipment. Eskofot brought an antitrust action in federal court
alleging that defendants, E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. and its U.K. subsidiary
(collectively Du Pont) have monopolized domestic and international markets for
certain printing equipment. Du Pont moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, international comity, and failure to
state a claim for which relief can be provided. The district court denied the
motions.
Du Pont contended that U.S. antitrust law did not apply to the defendants'
conduct pursuant to the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA),
which they claimed governs the extraterritorial application of American antitrust
laws.98 Plaintiffs argued that the FTAIA did not apply in this case because their
claim involved import commerce of the United States. The court found that the
FTAIA, on its face, clearly states that import trade or import commerce is not
included in its restrictions on the applicability of the Sherman Act. 99 It then held
that plaintiff alleged sufficient facts that, if proved, could support a claim that
defendants' conduct had an anticompetitive effect on U.S. trade or commerce.
Defendants argued that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Du Pont
U.K. under New York law and that the nexus between Du Pont U.K. and the
forum did not meet minimum standards of constitutional due process. The court
found that personal jurisdiction existed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 4(k)(2), which applies to claims arising under federal law.1'0 The court also
determined that Du Pont U.K. had the requisite minimum contacts with the United
States to meet constitutional due process requirements. The acts complained of
by plaintiff-preventing Eskofot's participation in the U.S. market for printing
equipment-had a direct effect in the United States. Moreover, Du Pont U.K.
marketed, advertised, and sold its products in the United States. These factors
98. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1994).
99. Id.
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).
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together provided sufficient factual allegations to support personal jurisdiction
without violating traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.1'
Finally, the court declined to dismiss or stay the action in U.S. federal court
because plaintiff commenced a parallel action in England. The court ruled that
the two actions could proceed simultaneously because the U.S. suit involved
important issues that would not be reached in the English action. For example,
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., the U.S. parent of Du Pont U.K., was not a
defendant in England, nor was American antitrust law at issue.
B. CRIMINAL
1. Colello v. United States Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 908 F. Supp. 738
(C.D. Cal. 1995)
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigated plaintiff Michael
Colello for his part in an allegedly fraudulent investment scheme. The day before
the SEC filed an enforcement action against Colello, the United States asked the
Swiss Government to freeze his bank accounts in Switzerland pursuant to the
U.S. -Swiss Mutual Criminal Assistance Treaty.1 02 The Swiss Government com-
plied. After Colello lost his case in Swiss courts contesting the legality of the
asset freeze, he and plaintiff Robert Romano brought this action challenging the
constitutionality of the freeze of his bank accounts in Switzerland.
The court first considered the propriety of judicial review of the constitutional-
ity of a treaty. It concluded that plaintiffs claims that the treaty denied him of
his constitutional rights were justiciable.
Second, the court held that defendants violated plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment
right to due process by failing to notify them when they requested the Swiss
Government to freeze the assets and by denying them a hearing. It also held
that the Mutual Criminal Assistance Treaty itself is unconstitutional. It violates
citizens' rights to due process by not requiring U.S. officials to notify them of
a request made thereunder or to provide a postdeprivation hearing.
Finally, the court found that the United States Government violated plaintiffs'
Fourth Amendment rights by its unreasonable seizure of plaintiffs' assets. Because
the Mutual Criminal Assistance Treaty requires only reasonable suspicion, not
probable cause, as a standard for mutual assistance, the court also held that the
Mutual Criminal Assistance Treaty violates the Fourth Amendment.'0 3
101. Eskofot A/V v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours, 872 F. Supp. 81, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
102. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, U.S.-Switz., 27 U.S.T.
2019 (hereinafter Mutual Criminal Assistance Treaty).
103. Id. at art. 1, § 2.
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2. Looper v. Morgan, No. H-92-0294, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10241
(S.D. Texas 1995, June 23, 1995)
On January 24, 1992, as Donald Looper, an attorney, disembarked from an
airplane at Houston International Airport, agents of the U.S. Customs Service
seized his briefcase and its contents for suspected violation of the regulations of
the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Mr. Looper represented Holborn
International, Ltd., now called Coastal Securities, a company chartered in Ber-
muda with several subsidiaries abroad. OFAC officials monitored these compa-
nies for violations of the 1986 OFAC sanctions against Libya arising from the
sale by a Holborn subsidiary in Cyprus of the majority stock in an oil refinery
to a Libyan Government agency. OFAC suspected that the sale was part of an
arrangement by which Coastal would pay Libya back for oil exploration that it
conducted prior to the sanctions in 1986. Coastal filed a license application with
OFAC for permission to pay the debt but never followed up on the request.
Looper objected to the seizure, claiming attorney-client privilege. That same
day, the court issued a temporary restraining order directing Morgan, the U.S.
Customs Service agent who sought to search the briefcase, to seal the documents
and deliver them to the U.S. Marshal, who would in turn transport them to the
court.
As a threshold matter, the district court ruled that the Customs agent's search
of an attorney's privileged documents at the border was a nonroutine search that
required a warrant or subpoena in advance of reading, duplicating, or seizing
such privileged documents.'04 The next issue was whether the documents in the
briefcase fell within the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege.
The government advanced two arguments: (1) that the communications between
Looper and his client are not privileged because Looper has committed a crime
by rendering legal services either (a) to a Libyan client, or (b) to a non-Libyan
client that indirectly benefit a Libyan entity, and (2) that communications between
Looper and his client are not privileged because Looper's client has committed
a crime and sought Looper's assistance in carrying out that crime.10 5
The court rejected the government's first argument because:
(1) under the operative facts recited in this opinion, Looper has done nothing criminal,
and (2) even if the evidence before the Court were to raise a prima facie case that
Looper has done something criminal, a lawyer's criminal behavior does not operate
as an exception to his or her client's attorney-client privilege. Only the client's criminal
purpose should operate to extinguish a privilege that belongs solely to the client. In re
Grand Jury Subpoena, 43 F.3d at 972 ("The test is whether the client's purpose is
the furtherance of crime or fraud."). Moreover, because the work-product privilege
"belongs to both the client and the attorney," "either one . . . may assert it." Id.
104. Looper, No. H-92-0294, 1995 U.S. Lexis 10241 at 15-16.
105. Id.
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"An innocent attorney may invoke the [work-product] privilege even if a prima facie
case of fraud or criminal activity has been made as to the client." Id. 'o
The mere representation of a non-Libyan national in a transaction that benefits
a Libyan national was not a crime according to the court, and was beyond OFAC's
power to declare criminal. In dicta, the court further opined that even if Looper
did something criminal in representing a Bermuda corporation in a transaction
with a Libyan national, the crime-fraud exception would not justify searching
these documents because the exception only reaches communications made for
the purpose of getting advice for the commission of a fraud or crime-a future,
not past, event. 1
07
The court examined the legal basis for the violation asserted by OFAC in three
parts: (1) whether OFAC gave Looper's client(s) fair notice of what is and is
not prohibited, (2) whether OFAC has granted itself the power to declare activities
criminal after the fact, and (3) whether the Executive (either OFAC or the Reagan
Administration) has exceeded the scope of the authority specifically delegated
by Congress.
The United States Congress granted the President the power to declare transac-
tions with designated entities criminal by way of (1) The International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-05; (2) the Trading with
the Enemy Act (TWEA), 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44; and (3) the United Nations
Participation Act (UNPA), 22 U.S.C. § 287c. The sanctions against Libya are
premised on IEEPA. The court noted that the United States has encountered
difficulty in its efforts to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign subsidiar-
ies of U.S. companies that trade with embargoed countries such as Libya. 
°8
Other nations have taken the position that U.S. subsidiaries incorporated under
their laws assume their nationality and are not subject to U.S. law. The court
suggested that the "evading or avoiding" clause of OFAC's Libya sanctions
regulations limited the effect of this jurisdictional hurdle, "Any transaction for
the purpose of, or which has the effect of, evading or avoiding any of the provisions
set forth in this Subpart is hereby prohibited. "'09 The government relied in part
on this provision to declare that the work Looper and/or one or more of his
clients performed for the oil refinery transaction was a prohibited activity. "°
The court then discussed constitutional problems with OFAC's view of its
extended chain of delegation from the Congress to the President, from the Presi-
dent to OFAC, and from OFAC to draft regulations enforceable at the direction
of itself or the President. The court concluded that the Libyan sanctions regula-
106. Id. at 17-18.
107. Id. at 2 1, citing United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554,562-63 (1989). For a detailed discussion
of the attorney-client privilege and the crime-fraud exception, see pages 17-29.
108. Id. at 35; see reprint of UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE: LIBYA TRADE SANCTIONS 2-3 & n. 1 (May 1987).
109. Department of Treasury Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 550.208 (1994).
110. Looper, No. H-92-0294, 1995 U.S. Lexis 10241 at 36.
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tions, as interpreted by OFAC, violate either of two fundamental constitutional
principles: (1) that retroactive lawmaking must be avoided when criminal punish-
ment is at stake, and (2) that rules that impose criminal punishment must provide
fair advance notice of the conduct prohibited."'
In addition to chastising OFAC for asserting unfettered discretion in creating
and enforcing sanctions violations, the court held that the practice of retroactive
rulemaking (that is, deciding after the fact that a given behavior or transaction
violates the sanctions) "operates in a manner that is irreconcilable with the Con-
gressional intent to provide a 'good faith' defense under IEEPA for actors who
attempt to structure their transactions to comply with the sanctions regulations.""
2
In attempting to construe OFAC's regulations in a permissible way, the court
stated:
The Constitution certainly cannot abide the Kafkaesque interpretation that OFAC pro-
poses-that the Libyan sanctions regulations prohibit, at the whim of OFAC regulators,
any effort to structure transactions with the purpose of complying with the remainder
of the Libyan sanctions regulations, including any attempt to hire an attorney for guid-
ance. 113
In applying the law to the case, the court concluded that the crime-fraud excep-
tion applies only if the attorney received a communication seeking advice with
the apparent purpose of violating an aspect of the sanctions regulations that was
sufficiently clear; the exception should not apply to any communication the client
has initiated in an apparent effort to comply with the regulations." 4 The court
found no apparent attempt to violate the sanctions regulations, and rejected the
application of the crime-fraud exception accordingly.
Specifically, the court found that "[b]ecause the client Looper represented in
the German refinery transaction is not a United States person, the transaction
could not violate the Libyan sanctions regulations.' Therefore, the client could
not seek advice for the purpose of violating the regulations and the crime-fraud
exception is not applicable.""
6
3. Lobue v. Christopher, 893 F. Supp. 65 (D.D.C. 1995)
The Canadian Government charged plaintiffs Anthony Lobue and Thomas
Kulekowskis with kidnapping and requested their extradition from the United
States pursuant to the Canada-U.S. extradition treaty. "7 A federal magistrate
judge found them extraditable. Plaintiffs then brought this action in U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia against the Secretary of State, the Department
111. Id. at 42.
112. Id. at 47-48, citing 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(3) (1994).
113. Id. at 49.
114. Id. at 50.
115. Citation omitted.
116. Id. at 53.
117. Treaty on Extradition, Dec. 3, 1971, U.S.-Can., 27 U.S.T. 983.
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of State, and the United States, seeking a declaratory judgment that the extradition
statute was unconstitutional and seeking an injunction against their extradition.
The extradition statute governs extradition procedure."' According to § 3184
of the extradition statute, before an individual charged with committing a crime
in another country may be extradited, a federal extradition judge must conduct
a hearing, receive evidence, and issue a legal ruling on the extraditability of the
accused individual under the applicable statute.1"9 If the judge finds the require-
ments for extradition are met, the individual is released. If the judge determines
the individual is extraditable, he certifies to the Secretary of State that a warrant
may issue. 2 0 The Secretary of State then has discretion to complete the extradition
process by signing the warrant of surrender.
The issue addressed by the court in this case was "whether a statute may
confer upon the Secretary of State the authority to review the legal determinations
of federal extradition judges.' ' 2 ' The court held that the extradition statute is
unconstitutional because it violates the separation of powers. The court also
enjoined the Secretary of State from surrendering plaintiffs to Canada.
The court determined, first, that decisions of extradition judges are neither
binding nor final. If the judge finds the accused is not extraditable, this decision
has no res judicata effect. The government may continue to bring extradition
proceedings against the same individual on the same charges without limit. Deci-
sions of extradition judges are thus, under the statute, merely advisory opinions.
Second, the court found that the extradition statute permits the executive branch
to review decisions of extradition judges. The statute gives the Secretary of State
authority to conduct a de novo review of the record and the federal judge's
legal conclusions, and to make an independent decision whether to surrender the
accused. The court rejected the government's argument that the statute strikes
a balance between the due process rights of the accused and significant foreign
policy interests of the United States, including compliance with treaty obligations,
comity, and mutual law enforcement obligations. The court concluded that permit-
ting the executive branch to review and set aside a legal determination of extradita-
bility made by the judicial branch violates constitutional separation of powers.
C. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
1. In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana, on October 31, 1994,
909 F. Supp. 1083 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
American Eagle Flight 4184 crashed near Roselawn, Indiana, on October 31,
1994, while in a holding pattern near O'Hare International Airport, killing all
118. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3195 (1994).
119. Id. at § 3184.
120. Id.
121. Lobue v. Christopher, 893 F. Supp. 65, 68 (1995).
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on board. Plaintiffs, representing the estates of crash victims, filed thirty-two
related actions in state court in Illinois. Defendants are the airline, its related
entities, and Avions de Transport, Regional, G.I.E. (ATR), allegedly the manu-
facturer of the aircraft.
ATR is a French company. France's national aerospace company, Socidt6
Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale (SNIA), owns 50 percent of ATR's shares.
The French Government, in turn, owns 91.42 percent of SNIA's shares, 62
percent directly and the rest through wholly or partly owned companies. Alenia,
a division of Finmeccanica S.p.A., Italy's national aerospace concern, owns the
other 50 percent of ATR. The Italian Government owns 62 percent of Finmeccan-
ica through a wholly owned holding company.
ATR removed the state court actions to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(d). This section permits parties to a civil action brought in state court
against a foreign state, as defined in the FSIA, to remove the action to federal
court and try the case without a jury.'22 Plaintiffs in this action moved to remand
to state court, contending that ATR's ownership structure does not entitle ATR
to the status of a foreign state as defined in the FSIA. 123 The court denied the
motion.
Plaintiffs first maintained that the FSIA confers "foreign state" status only
when one foreign state owns a majority interest in an entity. Plaintiffs claimed
the FSIA does not permit pooling of ownership interests of several entities for
calculating the total foreign state ownership of the entity. The court determined
that a majority of courts have permitted pooling of ownership interests to deter-
mine whether § 1603(b)(2)'s majority ownership requirement is met. Moreover,
the court found no sound policy justification not to apply the FSIA to an entity
that is majority owned by two or more foreign states.
Plaintiffs also contended that the FSIA does not permit tiering of ownership
interests through corporate intermediaries such as SNIA and Alenia. The court
disagreed. The court held that the definition of a "foreign state" in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1603(a) and "an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1603(b) leads to the conclusion that tiering is permissible. Section 1603(a)
defines a foreign state to include an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.
If a corporation is majority owned by a foreign state, the corporation falls under
the definition of a foreign state, making its majority-owned subsidiary an agency
or instrumentality of a foreign state. In view of the foregoing analysis, the court
concluded that ATR's motion to remove to federal court under the FSIA was
proper.
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1994).
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1994).
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2. Bybee v. Oper der Standt Bonn, 899 F. Supp. 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
Plaintiff Luretta Bybee and her husband are opera singers residing in New York
City. Defendant Oper der Standt [sic] Bonn (Bonn Opera Company), through its
General Manager, defendant Gian-Carlo del Monaco, offered them positions in
the company. Plaintiff accepted the offer but her husband declined. Defendants
allegedly reneged on Bybee's contract because of her husband's action.
In May 1993, plaintiff filed a claim in New York federal court for breach of
contract, intentional and negligent misrepresentation, negligent hiring, defama-
tion, and intentional and negligent interference with prospective contractual rela-
tions. By November 1993, plaintiff served defendants in Germany in accordance
with the Hague Service Convention. 12 4 Defendants failed to answer the complaint.
The court entered a default judgment in June 1994 and scheduled a hearing on
damages. Because the original complaint lacked specificity on damages, the court
gave Bybee the choice of filing an amended complaint or limiting her damages
to $50,000. She chose to file an amended complaint, claiming $178,000 in contract
damages and $10,000,000 in other damages. The court ordered the amended
complaint served on defendants by international federal express with a German
translation.
Defendants retained New York counsel and moved to dismiss the complaint
on three grounds. First defendants challenged subject matter jurisdiction pursuant
to the FSIA. 2 5 The court agreed with plaintiff that, although defendants were
an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, their actions in offering Bybee
a singing contract fell within the FSIA's commercial activity exception.1
2 6
The court held, however, that because plaintiff did not properly serve defen-
dants under § 1608(b) of the FSIA, the court lacked personal jurisdiction over
them. Mail service as ordered by the court under FSIA § 1608(b)(1) was not
proper because Germany opted out of mail service under the Hague Service
Convention, leaving service pursuant to FSIA § 1608(b)(2) under the Hague
Service Convention the only available option. Plaintiff could not use § 1608(b)(3)
of the FSIA because this section applies only when parties cannot serve under
§§ 1608(b)(1) or (2).
Finally, since personal jurisdiction did exist for the original complaint, for
which service was proper under the Hague Service Convention, the court reached
defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
The court weighed both private interest and public interest factors and held that
the balance was strongly in favor of litigating in Germany. The court noted that
124. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Com-
mercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 (hereinafter Hague Service
Convention).
125. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994).
126. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(a), 1604 (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994).
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a suitable alternative forum exists in Germany, New York choice of law principles
favored application of German law to Bybee's claim, and the parties wrote the
contract in German. The court dismissed the amended complaint on the grounds of
forum non conveniens, but required defendants to waive any statute of limitations
defense that would make a German forum unavailable to plaintiff.
3. Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 886 F. Supp. 306
(E.D.N.Y. 1995)
Plaintiffs Bruce Smith and Paul Hudson are the husbands of two of the Pan
Am Flight 103 passengers who died when the plane exploded over Lockerbie,
Scotland, on December 21, 1988. They brought multiple tort claims against the
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Libya) for the wrongful deaths of
their wives. Libya moved to dismiss the claims for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion under the FSIA and principles of international law. The court granted Libya's
motion to dismiss.
Plaintiffs claimed subject matter jurisdiction under several FSIA exceptions
to sovereign immunity. First, they contended that the United Nations Charter of
1945 (U.N. Charter) preserved jurisdiction under the existing agreement excep-
tion, and specifically referred to Security Council Resolutions 731 and 748,
passed in 1992, which call on Libya to accept responsibility for the bombing
incident.' 27 The court rejected this argument because, although the U.N. Charter
existed when Congress passed the FSIA in 1976, the two resolutions did not.
The existing agreement exception requires an international agreement to exist
when Congress enacted the FSIA and to conflict with the FSIA's immunity provi-
sions. 128
Smith and Hudson next sought jurisdiction over Libya based on the "commer-
cial activity" exception to the FSIA.129 The court rejected this argument, stating
that the exception was inapplicable because the sole cause of action was tortious
injury.
Plaintiffs' third basis for asserting jurisdiction was the "non-commercial tort"
exception. 130 The court determined that this exception was inapplicable because
the injury-the explosion of the aircraft-occurred outside U.S. territory on Scot-
tish soil.
Finally, plaintiffs argued that Libya implicitly waived immunity, establishing
jurisdiction under FSIA § 1605(a)(1).13' They referred to a letter written to the
Secretary of the United Nations by a Libyan Government official, guaranteeing
127. Charter of the United Nations with the Statute of the International Court of Justice annexed
thereto, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 933; 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994).
128. Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 886 F. Supp. 306, 310 (E.D.N.Y.
1995).
129. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994).
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1994).
131. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1994).
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compensation by Libya in the event that a party convicted two suspected Libyan
nationals of a crime and sued them for damages. The court, noting that an implicit
waiver should be construed narrowly, held that neither the letter to the U.N.
Secretary nor Libya's alleged terrorist activities fell under the narrow range of
activities that warrant a finding of implied waiver.
IV. State Courts
A. REPUBLIC OF HAITI v. DUVALIER, 626 N.Y.S.2D 472
(N.Y. ApP. DIv. 1995)
Plaintiff is the current Republic of Haiti. Defendant is the wife of deposed
dictator Jean Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier. Plaintiff alleged that Duvalier as-
sisted her husband to embezzle millions of dollars from Haiti and deposit them
in foreign bank accounts between 1980 and 1986.
Haiti brought an action against Duvalier in New York courts alleging embezzle-
ment and conversion of government funds in violation of Haitian and New York
law. Haiti sought recovery of funds deposited in New York bank accounts. The
court below dismissed the complaint on grounds that the act of state doctrine
precluded adjudication in a New York court. Plaintiff appealed.
The appellate court reversed, granted partial summary judgment to plaintiff
as to liability, and remanded for determination of damages. The court held that
the act of state doctrine did not apply in this case because the foreign sovereign-
the Republic of Haiti-was itself seeking adjudication of the case, the regime
that committed the act of state in question no longer existed, and the United
States Government officially supported Haiti's position. Therefore no foreign
policy reason compelled the court to decline jurisdiction.
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